Theologian: Thomas Aquinas
Problem: The Immutability of God
Explanation: The Angelic Doctor writes the following on divine immutability:
From what precedes (cf. Mal. 3:6), it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part . . . thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. (ST 1a.9.1)This passage illustrates precisely what is problematic about classical metaphysical thought. The three arguments Thomas brings forward in defense of immutability are based on abstractions. The first (and strongest) argument defines what must be true of God based on what must be true of the “first being,” which is simply an abstract concept which Thomas then identifies as the God of biblical revelation. The movement is not from the God we concretely meet in Scripture to the “first being,” but rather from the “first being” to God. The second and third arguments argue on the basis of “everything that moves.” Because all moving objects function in a certain way, it follows that God is not an object that moves. Again, the movement is from abstraction to concretion—moreover, from created earthly abstractions to an uncreated transcendent concretion. In the end, metaphysics ends by swallowing up God in abstraction rather than elucidating the concrete nature of God in accordance with God’s revelation.
Perhaps the most telling failure in Thomas’ presentation of divine immutability is the inability of this immutable God to do anything new. Because God is actus purus, there is no conceivable sense in which God can do a new thing. In other words, what’s done is done. God is static and immovable, and no new event can ever occur. This of course is hard to square with the biblical narrative; one has to assume that the experience of newness in relation to God is simply a phenomenological illusion. All of this comes to a head when we reach Jesus Christ. How is the incarnation possible? Was God always incarnate? Is the incarnation also just a phenomenological illusion? And what about the eschaton? How can we hope for a new heavens and new earth? I do not see a way for Thomas to adequately answer these questions on the basis of divine immutability, at least as he has conceived it here.
Thomas is without question one of the greatest (if not the greatest) theologian who has ever lived, but he is plagued by problems that the Christian witness must answer if it is to be credible. In the end, the greatest problem with Thomas’ immutable God is that one cannot worship such a being. One cannot worship a static entity which has no movement, no relational identity, no history. That does not mean we need to throw out the doctrine of divine immutability. Certainly, the triune God is the same yesterday and today and forever, but God is the same as the one who is immutably faithful to the covenant of grace, as the God who from eternity past has willed to be God for us in Jesus Christ, as the God who will one day make all things new (Rev. 21:5).
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